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THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF
EXTRALEGAL STATE ACTION:
A General Lesson for Debates on Public
Emergencies and Legality
François Tanguay-Renaud∗
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extralegally in the sense of
acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the
writings of Hans Kelsen and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus
in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify
their arguments and ultimately contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as
a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.

General theorizing about state responses to public emergencies—or, to
speak in the terms of art, theorizing about “emergency powers” or “states
of emergency”—is often deemed worthless. Skeptics ask: Is it not the case
that, given the elasticity of the concept of emergency and the wide range
of events that may qualify as such, general attempts at theorizing state responses to them are no different from attempts at theorizing state responses
to, say, events that happen on Wednesdays? There seems to be at least some
truth to this objection. Then again, public emergencies continue to fascinate contemporary legal and political theorists, a fact that leaves one to
wonder whether there may not be more fundamental and interesting issues
at the root of their unrelenting interest. The central goal of this article is
to unearth and address one such issue, whose importance transcends the
province of emergencies: Does it make sense to think of states as entities
capable of acting in ways that depart from the law?
Carl Schmitt, whose work often constitutes the starting point of treatises
on emergencies and legality, thought the answer obvious. For him, “it is
∗ I would like to thank Elizabeth Angell, John Gardner, Michael Giudice, Leslie Green, Wil
Waluchow, the participants in the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group, at which this paper
was presented in May 2010, as well as two anonymous referees, for discussion, comments, and
criticisms. Special thanks are also owed to David Dyzenhaus for sharing some of his work prior
to publication.
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clear that,” in various exceptional situations, “the state remains, whereas
law recedes.”1 However, this position is contentious and sometimes rejected
on the ground of unintelligibility. This kind of challenge has most recently
been associated with the work of David Dyzenhaus, who argues that “when a
political entity acts outside of the law, its acts can no longer be attributed to
the state,” and moreover, “they have no authority.”2 It is with this conceptual
rejoinder and its most salient lineage—namely, the work of Hans Kelsen—
that I take issue in this article. I argue that whereas the correct position
may not be as obvious as Schmitt thought it to be, states can intelligibly
depart from domestic law3 and contravene both its duty-imposing and its
authorizing norms. This conceptual possibility is important, since it allows us
to ask intelligibly when, if ever, states may or should depart from the law and
what kinds of ex ante and ex post controls and modes of accountability should
be in place to deal with extralegal state actions. Conflations of state and law
à la Dyzenhaus and Kelsen should not stand in the way of such important
inquiries.

I. TWO SETS OF PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Situating the Inquiry: Avoiding Dyzenhaus’s Normative Red Herrings
When thinking about the question that is being asked here in light of
recent scholarship on public emergencies, one must be careful not to misunderstand it and slip into a more normative or moral kind of inquiry.
The question I am asking is this: Does it make conceptual sense to think of
states as having the ability to act extralegally? For Dyzenhaus, who claims to
be following Kelsen’s views on this issue, the answer is negative. However,
unlike Kelsen’s position, to which I return in greater detail in Section II,
Dyzenhaus’s position also has a moral dimension, which tends to obscure
this conceptual commitment.4 Exploring briefly how it does so allows me to
situate my inquiry in relation to different yet related questions that could
1. C. SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
(G. Schwab trans., 2005), at 12.
2. D. DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006),
at 199. He sometimes provocatively refers to this thesis as “the central assumption of legal
theory.” D. Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY
(V.V. Ramraj ed., 2008), at 36, 56–57.
3. In this article, I bracket, by and large, questions about international law.
4. To be more precise, while Dyzenhaus often claims to adhere to Kelsen’s conceptual
framework, recent writings betray the fact that he also construes it through the prism of political
morality. For example, in an essay to be published in French as L’état d’exception, in TRAITÉ
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (M. Troper & D. Chagnollaud eds., forthcoming
2010), he explicitly writes that Kelsen’s position can also be understood “not with Kelsen
himself as the expression of a scientific hypothesis about the nature of law, but rather . . . as
liberalism’s political aspiration to have all public power controlled by law” (page 7 of English
typescript, on file with the author).
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also be asked about the relationship between state and law—questions that
can be conflated with the conceptual question I am asking only on the basis
of questionable assumptions.
For Dyzenhaus, the argument is “not only that the state’s authority has to
be exercised through law, but also that this requirement provides a moral
basis for the state’s claim to authority” wherever and whenever it may manifest itself, including in times of severe public emergencies.5 Admittedly,
it is widely believed that there is special virtue in regulating conduct by
law because of certain important values that legal systems help secure. As
a result, adherence to the rule of law is often considered to be one of the
central determinants of the moral legitimacy of state governance. The rule
of law, it is often claimed, is preferable to arbitrary government or anarchy.
However, even if one concedes arguendo that the rule of law is preferable to
other forms of rule (and nonrule) and that states should seek to abide by it,
this concession does not entail that states cannot conceivably depart from
the law.
Much of the tension in Dyzenhaus’s work emanates from his endorsement
of a thick conception of law and of the value of its rule, one that “links procedural constraints to substantive values.”6 Dyzenhaus understands the rule
of law as an aspiration that should be shared by all branches of government
to secure values, such as “fairness, reasonableness, and equality,” whose content “is inevitably influenced by our evolving view of the individual who is
subject to the law . . . as a bearer of human rights.”7 His conception is so
thick that it leads him to describe law as a potentially “inexhaustible” repository of “moral resources” for the states it regulates.8 He goes on to query
whether “law” that did not contain such resources would still really be law,
since “law presupposes the rule of law, in the substantive sense.”9
For Dyzenhaus, then, the rule of law amounts to something like the rule of
fundamental values and, for all intents and purposes, it is coterminous with
morality in its application to states.10 Since morality is not the type of thing
that those to whom it applies can avoid, it is not surprising that he claims
that states should always act “within the law” and “through law,” that is to
say, morally, even when confronted with severe emergencies. Note, however,
that even if one accepts Dyzenhaus’s thick conception of legality, this last
observation in no way entails that states cannot, conceptually speaking, act
illegally (qua immorally), or even, as he also claims, that it is always possible

5. Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 37.
6. DYZENHAUS, CONSTITUTION OF LAW, supra note 2, at 14.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 63–65.
9. Id. at 4–7. Law, as he later reformulates, “is constituted by values that make government
under the rule of law worth having,” id. at 139.
10. He sometimes speaks of “constitutional morality.” See, e.g., D. Dyzenhaus, The Puzzle of
Martial Law, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 1–64 (2009), at 39, 49, 53.
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for them to act in legally (qua morally) acceptable ways.11 For example,
there may well be situations, often referred to as moral dilemmas, in which
all options available to a state would involve unjustified moral wrongdoing.
Although Dyzenhaus is probably right to point out that no theory of morality
or legality should focus exclusively or even centrally on such tragic cases,
they can certainly not be ignored.
Oddly, Dyzenhaus resolutely refuses to concede this point, given his adherence to what he takes to be Kelsen’s core conceptual commitment—that
is, that the notion of state presupposes the notion of law and that a state is
in fact nothing but a national legal system.12 To the extent that this “identity thesis” is accurate, it is indeed difficult to claim intelligibly that a state
can depart from the law of that system—that is, from itself. I return later
to Kelsen’s thesis. For the moment, notice only the implausibility of coupling such identification of state and law with the claim that law is akin to
public morality. This juxtaposition of claims implies that states cannot act
immorally, which no doubt represents a deeply counterintuitive proposition. If Dyzenhaus held the common view that law is irredeemably morally
fallible, this problem would not arise, but remember that his claim is that
law’s potential to provide appropriate moral resources is inexhaustible.
To be fair, Dyzenhaus does, in a somewhat curious way, recognize that
law—let us refer to it as morally legitimate law to account for his view—can
sometimes run out. He persistently refuses to distance himself from A.V.
Dicey, who maintains that the prospect of “times of tumult or invasion”
requiring illegal state responses can never be fully discounted.13 I say that
this admission is curious, since Dyzenhaus, to avoid falling prey to a paradox, is forced to drive an uneasy wedge between “law” and “legality,” or
between what he also calls “rule by law” and “rule of law.” According to this
distinction, state reactions to public emergencies may intelligibly fall foul
of the law yet be “legal” at the same time. Unlawful reactions are legal in
this sense—Dyzenhaus speaks of reactions in a “spirit of legality”—when
they constitute proportionate responses that uphold what he counts as legal values. This move, he thinks, enables him to reconcile his own claim
about the unintelligibility of state illegality with Dicey’s remarks about the
possible need for official illegality in times of emergency as well as about
the appropriateness of acts of indemnity that may be adopted ex post facto
11. With respect to this last point, Dyzenhaus claims that to the extent that a state’s constitution is sufficiently flexible, it is “possible to exercise power through law in a way that sustains
the aspirations of legality.” Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 58; D. Dyzenhaus,
States of Emergency, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (R.E. Goodin, P.
Pettit, & T. Pogge eds., 2007), at 809–810.
12. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (2006), at 181–192; H. KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW (1967), at 286–319.
13. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959),
at 412–413. Dyzenhaus embraces this part of Dicey’s position most clearly in Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 46–48, 54–55, but also discusses it in DYZENHAUS, CONSTITUTION
OF LAW, supra note 2, at 53–57.
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to “legalize illegality.” He argues that such acts are appropriate when they
authorize retrospectively what was already “legal” in some sense. They ought
“to secure the rule of law, not to undermine it,” to “indemnif[y] action that
could and should have been authorized in advance.”14
I say that the wedge Dyzenhaus drives between “law” and “legality” is uneasy for two main reasons. First, by hinting that state agents can sometimes
act outside the law yet continue to sustain the aspirations of legality, Dyzenhaus seems to imply that his commitment to the Kelsenian thesis about the
identity of state and law is not as firm as he suggests elsewhere. This ambiguity provides evidence that the normative aspect of his argument, instead
of bolstering his basic conceptual stance, significantly obscures it. What is
more, the arc of his normative argument is itself difficult to comprehend.
Recall that despite driving a wedge between law and legality, Dyzenhaus also
defends the view that law presupposes the rule of law in a substantive sense.
Thus, to be consistent, he is left to defend the converse, seemingly paradoxical view that the rule of law does not presuppose law. Were Dyzenhaus
to conceive of the rule of law as a leaner, more legalistic ideal, this point
might have merit to the extent that at any given moment, there may be
aspects of the life of a society that do not need to be governed by ex ante,
clear, general, open, consistent, and stable rules of law for that society to be
ruled by law. In fact, excessive insistence on ex ante legal regulation might
even turn what would otherwise be a virtue (i.e., legality) into a vice (i.e.,
legalism). However, under Dyzenhaus’s thick conception, the point loses
much of the force it might otherwise have had.
To be sure, Dyzenhaus claims that his approach shows that “the exception [qua extralegal state action] can be banished from the legal order.”15
However, this is no more than a pyrrhic victory since it is won by disregarding much of what is distinctive about the rule of law. Moreover, as I
remark above, given his thick understanding of legality, Dyzenhaus’s amalgam of claims lead us, for all intents and purposes, to the implausibly strong
conclusion that states can only and always act in morally acceptable ways.
Ironically, Dyzenhaus thinks that another point in favor of his approach is
that it rests on an account of legality that is “more legal” than other, thinner
accounts that, he laments, ultimately amount to judicial or popular rule.
Drawing heavily on the work of Ronald Dworkin, Dyzenhaus claims that what
holds a legal system together is not so much judges or “the people” but values
inherent in the law.16 Of course, I cannot do justice to all the arguments that
have been offered over the years for and against this controversial claim.
14. Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 47. Arguably, it is also this wedge
between law and legality that allows him to conceive of wicked systems of law; e.g., D. DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY (1991).
15. DYZENHAUS, CONSTITUTION OF LAW, supra note 2, at 53.
16. D. Dyzenhaus, The State of Emergency in Legal Theory, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND
POLICY (V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor, & K. Roach eds., 2005), at 74–77; id. at 5–7.
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However, even Dworkin would object to a claim that law and legality can
pull in completely opposite directions and ultimately come apart in the
way envisaged by Dyzenhaus. In the context of his well-known discussion of
Mrs. Sorenson’s claim for damages, according to market shares, for injuries
suffered after taking a generic drug manufactured and marketed by many
undifferentiated companies, Dworkin writes: “[I]t would be nonsense to
suppose that though the law, properly understood, grants her a right to
recovery, the value of legality argues against it. Or that though the law, properly understood, denies her a right to recovery, legality would nevertheless
be served by making the companies pay.”17 Plainly, it is hard to understand
what is so legal about Dyzenhaus’s thickly value-laden account of legality.
My hope is that this partial yet critical survey of Dyzenhaus’s account of
the relation between state and law will serve as a note of caution against
conflating conceptual and morally oriented normative inquiries too easily,
given the important distinctions that tend to be lost or made implausible as
a result. In order to focus productively on the very real challenge posed
by the identity thesis and avoid Dyzenhaus-like slippages, it is methodologically important to distinguish the conceptual question of whether a
state can possibly depart from the law from the issue of the morality of
its actions—including the question of whether extralegal public actions
infringing the ideal of the rule of law may ever be morally legitimate. It
also seems important to default to an understanding of law and legality
that makes this distinction at least intelligible. Kelsen, on whose conceptual views Dyzenhaus claims to rest his challenge, embraced these premises.
Therefore it is on his more sharply focused conceptual objections that I
focus in Section II.

B. Different Types of Illegalities: The Power-Conferring/
Duty-Imposing Rule Distinction
Another structural issue, neglected by Kelsen and only inconsistently acknowledged by Dyzenhaus, must also be tackled at this preliminary stage if
one is to appreciate the multiple facets of their conceptual challenge: state
illegality, insofar as it is intelligible, may take different forms. Consider the
ambiguity that often surrounds the use of terms like “justification” and “illegality” in the context of the legal regulation of state conduct. State action
may be said to be “without legal justification” or “illegal” when it exceeds
the boundaries the law sets for the valid exercise of state power. It is also
sometimes said to constitute an “unjustified” breach of a legal duty and to
be “illegal” as a result. The ambiguity lies in the fact that in both cases the
relevant state behavior is legally the “wrong” thing to do, in the sense that it
breaches a legal rule whose primary function is to guide conduct. However,
17. R. Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1–37 (2004) at 25.
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as H.L.A. Hart emphasizes, the type of rule at stake is different in the two
cases.18
In the latter case, it is a duty-imposing (or obligation-imposing) rule
that is contravened. Rules of this kind require their addressees to take or
abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to do so or not, and are
paradigmatic of legal fields such as criminal law and tort law. Breaches of
duties imposed by the law are generally conceived as wrongs that as far as
reasonably possible should be set right: in the case of tortious and other
civil wrongs, by restitution to or compensation of any wrongfully aggrieved
party, and in the case of criminal wrongs, barring complete justification,
excuse, or other applicable grounds of exoneration, by condemnation and
punishment.
However, the rule breached in the first case is of a different sort. It is a
power-conferring (or authority-conferring or authorizing) rule. Although
such rules also serve to guide behavior, they are best understood not as
imposing duties but as conferring normative powers—that is, powers to
bring about various changes in their addressees’ own normative position
or that of others. For example, power-conferring rules may provide that
by doing or saying certain things, their addressees may introduce new dutyimposing rules, extinguish or modify old ones, or determine their incidence
or control their operations. In Hart’s words, power-conferring rules “are
more like instructions how to bring about certain results than mandatory
impositions of duty.”19 Legal power-conferring rules supply criteria for the
assessment of the legal validity of normative changes, so their breach does
not amount so much to wrongdoing as to a legally invalid or ultra vires
action. Such rules lie at the core of public law, understood as the amalgam of
legal branches such as constitutional and administrative law that specifically
seek to regulate the structure and powers of states.
Thus the paradigmatic judicial remedies in public law are not primarily
aimed at repairing or requiting but at controlling the legal validity of public action; for example, mandatory or prohibitory orders enjoining a state
organ to act within the law, “quashing” of invalid legal changes, or declarations of legal rights and powers, rather than restitution, compensation,
or punishment. I invite the reader to keep this distinction in mind in the
following sections, even when, as a reflection of the ambiguities of some of
the works discussed, I do not draw it as sharply as I do here.
Of course, in the law, duty-imposing and power-conferring rules are often
intimately associated. For example, in a common-law jurisdiction such as
England, if a state planning commission arranges for work to take place
on privately owned land without having the power to do so, it may commit
a tort of trespass. A statutory authorization for the conduct of such work
18. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2nd ed. 1994), chs 3–5; and see further J. RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (2nd ed. 1990), at 73–84, 97–106.
19. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982), at 219.
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FRANÇOIS TANGUAY-RENAUD

may well immunize the commission against liability by altering its normative
position, but in the absence of this immunity, the commission’s actions are
likely to constitute a civil wrong. A similar analysis may also apply to the
case of an American police officer who forcefully arrests somebody whom
she does not have the legal power to arrest, and is thereafter charged with
battery or assault.20 Note further that the exercise of state powers is itself
often subject to legal duties. Consider, for example, the various duties of
procedural fairness (or natural justice) that are generally held to apply to
state agencies with adjudicative powers. Thus legal powers may affect legal
duties, and legal duties may constrain exercises of legal powers. However,
these frequent interconnections should not obscure the fact that the types
of legal rules at stake differ and can be understood separately. When a state
agency in charge of issuing licenses for the sale of alcohol issues an invalid
one, it may well commit no wrong in the process. The operative rule is
power-conferring.
Thus state illegality, insofar as it is conceivable, might result from the
wrongful breach of constitutional, administrative, tort, or perhaps even
criminal law duties. However, much of public law is concerned with another
genre of regulation—power-conferring regulation—that has its own distinct
normative functions and consequences. When assessing whether states can
intelligibly depart from the law, it will be important to keep in mind both
possible types of departures.
II. STATES AS EXTRALEGAL ACTORS?
A. Situating and Problematizing Kelsen’s Identity Thesis
With these two sets of background considerations in mind, we are in a good
position to inquire into whether states can intelligibly depart from the law.
The first thing to note is that Kelsen’s conceptual identification of state
and law, which is at the root of the puzzle under consideration, has been
the subject of much controversy over the years. To start with, it has some
odd consequences. For example, it entails that each state can have only one
valid legal system and that a colony can never obtain its independence from
its colonizer by peaceful legal means (since, for Kelsen, legal continuity
implies continuity of state). What is more, the controversy extends deep
into debates about the nature and normativity of law, since, when asserting
that the state is simply another name for the legal order, Kelsen is really
20. Different legal systems may take different views as to whether legally invalid arrests are
also legally impermissible violations of legal duties or, conversely, whether legally impermissible arrests are also legally invalid. Unlike what some criminal law theorists seem to assume,
legal permissions to infringe duties and legal powers to act do not necessarily come together
harmoniously, even if, as I assume in the text, they sometimes may. Compare: M. Thorburn,
Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070 (2008). On the distinction between permissive and power-conferring norms: RAZ, supra note 18, at 85–106.
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contending that a legal system is irreducibly normative and cannot be seen
as the product of social facts. Thus he rejects the position, espoused by many
other legal positivists, that a sociologically understood entity or practice—
say, an independent political society in a habit of obedience to a sovereign,
in John Austin’s terms, or the social practice of a rule of recognition, in
Hart’s terms—stands at the foundation of a legal system. For Kelsen, the
state is the law and, as such, it is nothing but a “juristic” phenomenon all
the way down, tied together by chains of legal validity leading back to a
postulated basic norm. As a result, the acts of so-called state organs can
genuinely be imputed to the state only insofar as they are “an execution of
the legal order.”21
Can extralegal action be that of a state, so understood? In a way, it all depends on what is meant by “extralegal.” When a government, qua agent of
the state, creates new laws by recognizing nonlegal dependent reasons—say,
social customs—there is a sense in which it is necessarily acting extralegally
since it is bringing external norms into the law. So long as this process
of law creation is in tune with the requirements of the legal system, it is
compatible with Kelsen’s account. What Kelsen denies is that the state can
act extralegally in the sense of acting contrary to law. States cannot act in
dereliction of duty-imposing legal norms, since that would be antithetical
to their very nature; as Kelsen says: “A wrong-doing state would be a contradiction in itself.”22 Similarly, state organs can never intelligibly be said to
exceed the powers conferred upon them by authorizing legal norms.23 For
Kelsen, there is no need to extend the inquiry any further, since “there is
only a juristic conception of the State,” and no other.24
The inflexibility of Kelsen’s position is rather troubling. Besides the
grounds for skepticism listed above, one may question how, in light of
his conceptual framework, we should interpret civil and criminal law prohibitions targeted at “public bodies” or “the state,”25 or the oft-encountered
requirement of “state action” for violations of constitutional law. Kelsen
is not oblivious to these features of legal systems. However, his attempts
at dealing with them in accordance with his framework are rather tortuous. For example, he posits that legislation or legal regulation that is
21. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 189, 192.
22. H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 12 at 305.
23. Kelsen imprecisely treats authorizing or power-conferring norms as fragments of larger
duty-imposing norms. That said, he is still able to distinguish between cases in which a
governmental agent fails to satisfy such a fragment (and so fails to create any duty-imposing
norms) and cases in which it fails to satisfy a duty-imposing norm. See, for example, KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 192.
24. Id. at 189.
25. Examples abound of courts holding the state directly responsible for civil wrongs. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
and Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 337 (CA) (N.Z.) (Baigent’s Case). Reluctance to
hold the state or state bodies criminally responsible is greater, but there is openness towards it
in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS (Hans de Doelder & Klaus
Tiedemann eds., 1996), at 283, 297–299.
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constitutionally defective is not void ab initio but only voidable in the sense
that it is valid law, and thus an act of state, until it has been annulled by
a legally competent organ.26 Moreover, whereas Kelsen generally stands by
the view that “no delict [or wrong] in the sense of national law can be imputed to the State,” he also insists that the fulfillment of legal obligations—for
example, obligations to repair the wrongs caused by individual state officials in connection with their official functions—can be attributed to state.27
According to him, it is only breaches of duties that cannot be so attributed.
Then again, complicating the puzzle, he sometimes seems to slip and
concede, at the risk of self-contradiction, that the violation of certain legal
obligations—with a focus on obligations of a financial nature “to be fulfilled from state property”—can be attributed to the state. Here his efforts
at reconciliation are resolute, if somewhat perplexing. He argues that attribution to the state in such cases is “only a possible, not a necessary, mental
operation,” a legal fiction that can be abandoned for the more accurate
characterization of a violation by individual officials to be fulfilled from the
collective property of the members of the state.28
Thus, while Kelsen is receptive to the possibility of collective responsibility
for domestic legal wrongs perpetrated in connection with the official functions of state organs, he resists, even if sometimes hesitantly, characterizing it
as state legal responsibility (perhaps with one additional qualification, to be
discussed in the next section). Here, as elsewhere, one could be tempted to
try to tone down this claim by emphasizing that the scope of Kelsen’s project
is deliberately circumscribed to steer away from any sustained consideration
of extralegal phenomena. He asserts that his argument is restricted to the
development of a “pure,” or wholly “normative,” theory of law that “eliminate[s] from the object of the description everything that is not strictly
law.”29
Unfortunately for his defenders, Kelsen’s methodological proviso fails to
persuade with regard to his discussion of the state, given his frontal attack on
the intelligibility of “impure” understandings. Not only does Kelsen consider
but he also categorically discards such understandings as flawed: “There is
no sociological concept of the State besides the juristic concept. Such a
double concept of the State is logically impossible, if for no other reason
because there cannot be more than one concept of the same object.”30 Yet,
taking him at his word, is it not precisely what he is himself arguing when
asserting that conceptually speaking, state and law refer to one and the same
object? Or could it be that Kelsen is here being too dogmatic, and that there
is really something more “sociological” to the idea of the state—something

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 157–158.
Id. at 200; KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 12, at 305–306.
KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 12, at 308–310.
Id. at 1; KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 162.
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 188–189.
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more than a mere “animistic superstition”31 —that disassociates it at least
partly from the law and enables us to conceive of state legal departures? In
the sections that follow, I want to begin to flesh out two related sets of replies
that, although not uncontroversial, point, in my view, in the direction of an
affirmative answer.

B. Responsibility of the Incorporated State for Breaches of Legal Duties
Legal and political theorists often refer interchangeably to state and government while also recognizing that we tend to conceive of governments
as the embodiment of state agency. I propose to follow this usage for the
time being, since it is also found in a challenging recent literature suggesting that states, or state-governments, and some of their institutional
subparts can be nonfictional corporate agents irreducibly responsible for
their own illegalities (and immoralities).32 Could such a line of argument
falsify Kelsen’s position? It is certainly in tension with it and, I think, warrants
closer scrutiny.
Note, first, that the theorists in question do not deny that in a bid to legitimize their actions, state-governments tend to claim that everything they
do is lawful. Since it is part of the concept of law that the law itself claims
to be legitimate, such governmental claims are unsurprising. In fact, these
theorists might even concede that the central case of state-government
is a government that makes good on its claims and acts legally. What is
more, they do not deny that a legal or, to be more precise, a constitutional normative order is essential for state-government agency—quite the
opposite. What their position denies is that governments, qua duly constituted corporate agents, cannot conceivably act illegally (or, for that matter,
immorally).
The gist of their position is that some groups of interacting human beings
can be relatively autonomous agents—that is, that they can form intentional
attitudes and perform concerted actions that are irreducible to the attitudes
and actions of their members—thanks at least in part to the operation of
a normative framework. Modern state-governments, which are made up
of various (and often conflicting) institutional organs that are themselves
relying on the agency of countless individuals, are often said to fall in this
31. Id. at 191.
32. The most sophisticated defender of this position is Philip Pettit, who, in line with the
usage described, tends to refer to “states” and “governments” in the same breath. See, e.g., P.
Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007), at 199; C. List & P. Pettit, Group Agency
and Supervenience, in BEING REDUCED: NEW ESSAYS ON REDUCTION, EXPLANATION, AND CAUSATION
(J. Hohwy & J. Kallestrup eds., 2008), at 1. See also P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (1984); and D. Copp, On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from
“Normative Autonomy,” in 30 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: SHARED INTENTIONS AND COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY (P. French & H.K. Wettstein eds., 2006), the latter of whom prefers to stick with
the term “state” to refer to the group agents in question.
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category. They all have a complex normative framework—that is, a constitution, written or unwritten—that constitutes and divides labor between their
various organs, lays out principles of governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making, control, and review mechanisms. By jointly adhering
to this framework to a reasonable extent, individual members allow their
government qua corporate entity to form judgments and exhibit attitudes
as a coherent whole and to make reasonably consistent decisions over time
on the evaluative propositions (including ethical and legal propositions)
that they present to it for consideration.
Some theorists describe the process by which the moral agency of individuals is constitutionally coordinated to give rise to irreducible governmental
agency as a process of “institutionalization,” “integration,” or “conglomeration” that tends to survive specific individuals members and their political
regimes. In his latest work on the topic, Philip Pettit further refines this
claim. He notes that groups whose judgments depend on the judgments of
more than one individual can be agents insofar as they respond rationally
to their environments on a reasonably consistent basis. Constitutions facilitate group agency by assigning decisional roles to the group’s individual
members and setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To the extent
that the group’s constitution provides sufficient constraints against internal inconsistencies, the group operating under it may then be a relatively
autonomous agent over time (despite deriving all its matter and energy
from its individual human members). Pettit argues that constitutional constraints are sufficient for a group to be autonomous in this sense when
they ensure that under normal conditions, reason is “collectivized” such
that majority views do not always prevail and such that the group’s attitudes
cannot be described as a simple majoritarian function of the members’
attitudes.
In Pettit’s own words: “Autonomy is intuitively guaranteed by the fact that
on one or more issues the judgment of the group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding member judgments, so that its
intentional attitudes as a whole are more saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group.”33 He also insists that decision procedures
must be in place to guarantee that the group can change and correct its
irreducible attitudes, so as to ensure rational unity and consistency. State
constitutions often ensure such governmental autonomy over time by imposing a variety of balances and checks on governmental decision-making—
separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, federal division of powers,
bills of rights, judicial review, stare decisis, elections, impeachment procedures, and so on. Depending on how they are constituted, discrete
institutional corporate organs of government pertaining to its executive,
legislative, or judicial branches—sometimes at both federal and state, or
provincial, levels—can also be imbued with such relatively autonomous
33. Pettit, supra note 32, at 184.
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agency. In this sense, modern state-governments are admittedly “artificial
agents” or “creatures of law”—law does play a crucial role in constituting
and regulating the apparatuses that enable their agency (and, conceivably,
the agency of their institutional corporate subparts).34
However, even if, according to this line of argument, law plays a pivotal
role in constituting state-governments as irreducible agents, this concession
in no way implies that they are exclusively creatures of law. In fact, pace
Kelsen, such an inference seems unwarranted. In addition to being creatures
of law, state-governments are also sociopolitical creatures partly constituted
by the contributions, practices, attitudes, and persistent commitment of
their individual members as well as by nonlegal norms such as constitutional
conventions.35 Specifications of the notion of state-government in narrow
legalistic terms generally fail to give due regard to these extra dimensions.36
So we should not be misled into thinking that insofar as governments are
partly constituted as agents by law, they are to be equated with it and cannot
intelligibly contravene it. On the contrary, once constituted as agents, stategovernments may conceivably do all sorts of illegal (and immoral) things
de facto.
To be sure, one may question the extent to which a government can act
illegally on the additional ground that whatever a state-government does is
ultimately done by individuals acting on its behalf. That is, to the extent that
it is individuals who perform governmental deeds, are they not really the
ones acting illegally? When arguing that state-governments can conceivably
depart from the law, theorists such as Pettit are not denying that individuals
may have to answer personally to the law (or, for that matter, to morality)
and bear adverse normative consequences for what they do as enactors
34. Of course, this is only part of the story. “Quasi-states” may not have a sufficiently developed constitutional apparatus, and even when they do, their individual members may not
comply with it enough for them to qualify as full-blown autonomous corporate agents. Can the
position discussed here be extended beyond the most successfully “detached” and “neutral”
liberal democratic governments? As Toni Erskine reminds us, one ought to exercise a great
deal of caution before prematurely dismissing quasi-states as “failed states” unable to exercise
relatively autonomous moral agency. Many of them may, in fact, have all it takes to exercise
such agency. Although I cannot explore the point further here, it may also be the case that
institutional corporate moral agency comes in degrees. T. Erskine, Assigning Responsibilities to
Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and “Quasi-States,” in CAN INSTITUTIONS HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES: COLLECTIVE AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (T. Erskine ed., 2003), at 29–31.
Now, given that my present focus is on the conceptual possibility of state-governments genuinely departing from the law, the possibility of relatively autonomous governmental agency
suffices for my argument.
35. On the constitutional nature of constitutional conventions qua nonlegal social rules
regulating “the mode of conduct of government,” see J. Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional
Convention, 19 LEGAL STUDIES 24 (1999). Note, however, that for the sake of simplicity, I continue
to use “constitutional law” and “constitution” quite interchangeably unless the context makes
the distinction clear.
36. For a lucid account of how real-world constitutions tend to have both legal and sociopolitical components such that it is unwise to seek to account for them in wholly legal or political
terms, see G. Gee & G. Webber, What Is a Political Constitution?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2010).
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of a governmental deed. They simply contend that a state-government qua
corporate agent can also be “fit to be held [legally and morally] responsible”
as “the source of that deed: the ultimate, reason-sensitive planner at its
origin.”37
A short exercise in disambiguation may help clarify this use of the term
“responsible.” Responsibility theorists tend to argue that one must be “responsible” in a basic sense before one can violate norms (and thus perpetrate wrongs). They also often argue that one must at least be assumed to be
responsible in this basic sense before one can intelligibly be “held responsible” in the sense of being singled out by the law or by morality to bear the
adverse normative consequences of such violations.38 The basic responsibility in question is the ability, or “fitness,” to recognize and respond appropriately to reasons (including norms), and is a concomitant of rational agency.
According to the position under consideration, state-governments’ constitutions may enable them (as well as some of their institutional corporate
subparts) to process reasons for action systematically and form judgments
that are irreducibly their own, despite the need to draw on the resources
of their individual members to do so. State-governments can then plan
for action on the basis of their own judgments, identify some individuals as
agents to perform required tasks, and more or less ensure that they perform
them in the relevant manner. In other words, state-governments (and some
of their institutional corporate subparts) may control in a reason-sensitive
way for the performance of certain actions by individuals who act on their
behalf. The thought is that they are fit to be held responsible for what they
control in this way. They can arrange for illegal and immoral things to be
done or participate in doing them and, just like individual agents, they
can intelligibly be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences as a
result.
Admittedly, this understanding of government as the “source” of illegal
and immoral deeds needs to be fleshed out further. Pettit’s remark that
a corporate entity such as a state-government can be held responsible for
what “it arranges to have done, given the decisions it licenses and the constitution by which it channels those decisions,” suggests that he has in mind
a relatively direct form of attribution of consequential responsibility for
wrongdoing.39 When, for example, a government “arranges” for individuals
to perpetrate acts of torture by specifically delegating that task to them, it
37. Pettit, supra note 32, at 192.
38. The contrast I have in mind is akin to the one that H.L.A. Hart draws between “capacityresponsibility” and “liability-responsibility” and that J. Gardner refines using the labels of
“basic responsibility” and “consequential responsibility.” See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968), at 227–228; and J. Gardner, Hart
and Feinberg on Responsibility, in THE LEGACY OF H.L.A. HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 143–164 (M.H. Kramer et al. eds., 2008). I use the expression “holding responsible”
to refer specifically to the imposition of consequential (or liability) responsibility by the law
and morality (as well as, conceivably, norms of other kinds).
39. Pettit, supra note 32, at 196.
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operates, quite literally, as the ultimate reason-sensitive “source of the deed.”
A similar analysis may apply to broader governmental licenses and authorizations. A government that empowers officials to torture on its behalf no
doubt exercises a significant degree of control over the perpetration of torture. To the extent that Pettit’s account is sound and that legal and moral
duties are violated in the process, I see no reason to believe that the government in question can never conceivably be held consequentially responsible
in law as much as in morality (in addition to the individual perpetrators).
If it is wrong to torture people, it is also wrong for governments to instruct
and empower people to torture on their behalf. Thus Pettit would no doubt
criticize someone like Dyzenhaus, who seems to suggest along Kelsenian
lines that legal responsibility in cases of torture can lie only with “private
individuals,” for failing to address this kind of possibility.40
Of course, even on the basis of Pettit’s account, when officials violate
duties without clear governmental authorization, it is not always obvious that
their government has done anything wrongful. The individuals in question
may be the ultimate sources of their own deeds. Given that Dyzenhaus
argues that torture should never be officially condoned either ex ante or
ex post facto, this may be the point that he is trying to convey. To be
convincing, though, the point must be refined. In many situations in which
individual officials violate duties while acting without governmental license,
there may still be a question of accessorial governmental wrongdoing. For
example, a government may have provided individuals with the opportunity
to violate various duties, without per se empowering them to do so. It
may, say, have required police officers to patrol a peaceful demonstration
dressed in uniform, batons in hand. If they then run amok, beating innocent
protesters and detaining them capriciously, their government may not be in
a position to deny all responsibility. It may be held responsible for wrongfully
failing to control conduct that it should (and often was legitimately expected
to) have controlled or for wrongfully aiding or procuring it. In other words,
it may be held responsible as an accomplice.
Here there is really no need for a theorist like Pettit to deny that Dyzenhaus and Kelsen’s concern has some grounding in truth. There is likely a
point at which wrongs perpetrated by public functionaries are so severe, so
extraordinary, and so unconnected to their official roles and functions that
it would make little sense to talk of state-governments as a wrongdoers in
relation to them (except perhaps vicariously). But, as Pettit would surely
caution us, we should be careful not to jump too hastily to this conclusion.
What should we make of this account? On the plus side, it sensibly dodges
Kelsen’s criticisms directed at those who mysteriously characterize group entities such as states or substate corporate agents as “superhuman beings.”41
For Pettit, any sound account of irreducibly responsible group agents must
40. Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 54–55.
41. See, e.g., KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 108, 184–186.
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recognize that human beings are at the root, forefront, and center of their
existence and of everything they do—that is, individual humans provide
all their matter and energy, so that they are only “relatively” autonomous.
Pettit’s ontological assumptions are fundamentally individualistic and are
compatible with value humanism, according to which the value of anything, including group agency, ultimately derives from its contribution to
human life and its quality. One could also point out that his account has the
advantage of providing a distinct ground for holding groups such as stategovernments responsible—say, because their actions or organization made
harm likely or inevitable—when no similar ground is available for holding
individual contributors responsible. Such shortfalls of individual responsibility may arise when, for example, individual contributors to governmental
action avoid being held responsible for their acts owing to reasonable mistakes or ignorance, due care, duress, or other relevant factors. Legal regimes
of state responsibility may guard against such scenarios as well as diminish
the incentive to arrange things so as to increase their likelihood.
Still, some major questions subsist, of which I can unfortunately only
scratch the surface here. For example, as recent work in the theory of individual excuses has sought to demonstrate, the exonerating force of epistemic limitations and other types of pressures inherent in organizational
settings is arguably less significant than has traditionally been believed.42
One salient reason for this skepticism is as follows: insofar as individuals know—or, perhaps, should know—that they are participating in the
operation of a group decisional framework that may, by its very constitutional design, yield bad or harmful outputs, it is questionable whether they
should ever be able to escape consequential responsibility by invoking the
irreducibility of these outputs.
If this reasoning is sound, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument may not provide as compelling a case for regimes of group responsibility as Pettit thinks it does. Furthermore, if one digs deeper into the
details of his argument for irreducibility, one cannot help but notice the
stringency of its foundational rationale. As suggested above, Pettit contends
that a group displays irreducible agency when it “collectivizes reason” in
its formation of judgments, in the sense that it brings together individual
judgments in ways that may bring its overall judgment on some particular
matters into disaccord with the judgment of the majority of its individual members. Pettit claims that for such discrepancy to be possible, the
group’s constitution must require individual members to aggregate their
judgments on each premise of a decision rather than aggregate their final judgments on the overall decision. He also allows for more complex
42. See, e.g., J. MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009), at 131–154. McMahan’s insightful challenge
of soldiers’ claims of excuses for their decisions to fight in unjust wars, on the basis of epistemic
limitations and pressures inherent in their military and social position, is a case in point. Still,
much theoretical work remains to be done to elucidate organizational and corporate excuses
in all their complexity.
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“distributed premise-based procedures” where different subgroups specialize on judging specific premises, so long as ultimate group judgments are
constituted by aggregated judgments on separate premises as opposed to
overall decisions.43
While it is at least plausible that many state-governments, considered
holistically, with all their internal balances and checks, are constituted in
ways that normally satisfy this requirement, specific governmental organs
such as courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets, and administrative agencies may well not be so constituted. It cannot simply be assumed, as Pettit
sometimes seems inclined to do, that these governmental organs, or even
state-governments considered as wholes, will be agents capable of being
held responsible in an irreducible sense.
In the end, though, the most powerful challenge for this robust way
of thinking about state legal responsibility might be thought to reside in
Kelsen’s work itself. Indeed, insofar as it is just (or otherwise justified)
to hold a group responsible for a breach of legal duty, can the law not
simply treat the group as if it were per se capable of this breach? Kelsen
would probably insist that recourse to such legal fiction, whatever else we
may say about it, is much less obscure, counterintuitive, and difficult of
application than a more organic approach like Pettit’s. It is true that Kelsen
is uncomfortable with the idea of state legal wrongdoing and that insofar
as he comes close to recognizing it, he goes out of his way to relate it back
to the wrongs of certain individual officials—not state-governments or their
institutional corporate subparts. Yet, as I mention above, he is also receptive
to the possibility of some form of collective legal responsibility, of which he
speaks primarily in terms of a legal fiction—that is, the corporate “juristic
person,” which he characterizes as “a group of individuals treated by the law
as a unity, namely as a person having rights and duties distinct from those of
individuals composing it.”44 Such a fictional entity, he explains, is unified by
a specific system of norms—a “partial legal order”—regulating the behavior
of individual members and serving as the common point of imputation for
all human acts that are determined by it.45 When such acts violate duties
that the law imposes on the corporate juristic person, they result in wrongs
(or “delicts”) that are intelligibly, if only fictionally, attributable to it.
The key point to note here is that Kelsen asserts that “a delict which is a
violation of national law can be imputed to any . . . juristic person within
the national legal order.”46 Albeit commonly overlooked, this general acknowledgment seems to extend to any corporate organs of government
recognized by law as well as to the state-government holistically considered, which Kelsen occasionally refers to somewhat surprisingly as “the
43. These conclusions come primarily out of Pettit’s treatment of the well-known discursive
dilemma. See List & Pettit, supra note 32, at 80–88.
44. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 96 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 99–100.
46. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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State . . . distinguished by a material criterion.”47 Parting momentarily with
his otherwise monolithic understanding of the state, Kelsen concedes that
the bureaucratic apparatus of the state—comprising all its machinery and
individuals officials—is itself a “partial legal order,” just like any other corporate juristic person. As a result, it is at least open to question whether he
would deny the intelligibility of ascriptions of breaches of legal duties to the
state, so understood.
Of course, additional considerations, such as considerations of justice and
practicality, may affect the kinds of wrongs for which the law may legitimately
hold state-governments and their institutional corporate subparts responsible and what sorts of consequences it may impose on them as a result.
For example, the possible repercussions of group censure and punishment
on innocent individual group members and the individualistic nature of
the rights around which the criminal process is characteristically structured
often lead to greater reluctance to hold governmental (and other) groups
criminally rather than civilly responsible.48 However, my focus is here on
questions of intelligibility, not on questions of legitimacy, and the fact is
that Kelsen, like Pettit, has no qualms about the conceptual possibility of
holding governmental (or other) groups civilly or criminally responsible.
Admittedly, some readings of his work invite doubts about the intelligibility
of processes required to hold a state-government as a whole responsible for
breaches of domestic legal duties, insofar as such processes will likely themselves involve state courts and, in criminal matters, state prosecutorial and
penal authorities. But one should be careful not to move too fast. Although
admittedly a controversial position, if one allows that private arbitrators may
preside over civil cases and that private prosecutions and punishments are
at least conceivable, then the objection loses some of its force.49
Furthermore, nemo judex in causa sua is first and foremost a principle of
justice, not a conceptual necessity as this argument implies. Finally, even
if we concede the objection arguendo, it remains the case that distinctively
public governmental organs can intelligibly be held legally responsible for
wrongdoing, if not irreducibly then at the very least fictionally.
Recall that what Kelsen is at pains to deny is that legal wrongs can conceivably be attributed to the state understood as the legal order. However, as my
discussion of Pettit’s work starts to suggest, there is likely more to the idea of
“the state” than law. In fact, as Kelsen himself begins to recognize when talking of a secondary “material” sense of state, we may not even need to think
of the state in robustly irreducible sociolegal terms to see this. Yet his narrow
legalistic commitments prevent him from making this concession outright.
47. Id. at 194.
48. C.f. D.F. Thompson, Criminal Responsibility in Government, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1985), at 210–214, 223–226.
49. Those who believe that a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is a (or “the”) mark of
the state might cringe at such a suggestion. I, for one, tend to think that this claim is generally
inflated and that to exist, a state must only monopolize some relevant uses of force.
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His theoretical focus is on legal norms, which generally leads him to reject
rather rashly any talk of the state in terms that seek to capture its sociopolitical dimension—such as state-government, body politic, or res publica.
A more promising argumentative trajectory is no doubt that of those who
seek, or also seek, to account for this additional conceptual dimension by
characterizing the state as the political organization of society—that is, the
public, institutional, and territorial organization of a society’s governance
which, although not exclusively, is significantly constituted by law (and minimal respect for it), and whose exercises of power can themselves be both
legal and extralegal.50
While the main criticism of such accounts is that their parameters are
too messy, uncertain, and contested to have any theoretical purchase, their
proponents should not be deterred on such grounds.51 Conceptual contestability often reflects the complexity of our social, political, and legal
landscape, and a sound conceptual account should not strive to conceal it.
When seeking to hold the state, so understood, responsible for breaches
of duties—either as an irreducible agent or through recourse to a fiction—
the law may help cure doubt at the edges, as it does in respect of so
many other hazy sociolegal realities, by sharpening its boundaries authoritatively. To borrow an example from Canadian criminal law, an administrative
agency or local government may sometimes be singled out and charged as
a genuinely “public body,” rather than a mere private “body corporate,” to
reflect its direct connection to the political organization of society.52 Granting the intelligibility of possibilities of this sort seems all the more important
given the numerous reasons which, although contentious, might justify or
even morally require holding the state civilly or criminally responsible for
the acts of those who act in its name and behalf—for example, censure of
public complicity in wrongdoing, greater structural and political incentives
to exercise due care, more effective deterrence against widely countenanced
abuses carried out in the name of the state or the public by those holding
constitutionally defined offices or those having control over them, avoidance of shortfalls of accountability, vindication of legitimate expectations,
reasons of desert or of expressive symbolism, and so forth.53

50. See, e.g., N. MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY (1999), at 25–26.
51. This insight underlies much of the argument in Gee & Webber, supra note 36, about
the need to grapple with Britain’s “political constitution” as well as its “legal constitution” to
understand its nature as a state.
52. Both of these characterizations of “organizations” are, at least in principle, available to
Canadian prosecutorial authorities under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2, 22.1,
22.2. See also S.P. Green, The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1197
(1994); note 25 supra.
53. Of course, some of these purportedly justificatory reasons may cut both ways. For example, Joel Feinberg conceives of criminal condemnation and punishment for wrongdoing as
symbolic acts of “disavowal” by which the world is told that the perpetrator of a crime “was on
his own doing it, that his government does not condone that sort of thing.” J. Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397 (1974), at 404.
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Understanding the state in socio- or politicolegal terms makes such discourse intelligible in a way that a pure adequation of state and law does
not.54 It allows us to conceive of the attribution of legal wrongs to the state,
and to do so even when, strictly speaking, such wrongs are perpetrated ultra
vires.
Now, one might be tempted to interpret what I say above as leaving the
core of Kelsen’s normative theory of law intact. All that would be required
for this to be the case, one might think, is for him to acknowledge outright
that there is a sense of “the state”—perhaps an additional sense—that differs
meaningfully from the legal order, even if deeply interconnected with it,
and that makes state illegality intelligible. Thomas Hobbes, who, like Kelsen,
equates state—or, rather, Leviathan—and law for normative purposes, may
be seen as gesturing in this direction when he holds that conceptually
speaking, a commonwealth’s body politic, or monarch, can act illegally.55
The point is important and should not be lost upon theorists, and perhaps
especially emergency theorists, who engage with the recent work of scholars
such as David Dyzenhaus who purport to build on Kelsenian and Hobbesian
insights about “the state” without sufficiently demystifying them and their
methodological grounding in the first place.
Then again, one should be careful not to conclude too hastily that when
interpreted as I do here, Kelsen’s work adequately addresses all key concerns that animate theorists of group responsibility. Consider the following
point in particular. As I suggest above, Kelsen sometimes insists that even
insofar as legal duties and their breach can fictionally be imputed to corporate entities such as the state, at bottom the only “real” duties and breaches
are those of individuals. In the last analysis, he claims, only individual human beings’ actions can really fall under the scope of a legal norm: “The
obligations and rights of a legal person [be it corporate or noncorporate]
must be broken down into obligations and rights of human beings, that
is, into norms governing human behavior, establishing certain human acts
as obligations and rights.”56 So, even insofar as Kelsen can allow that state
legal wrongdoing is conceivable, he also insists that it is always reducible
to individuals’ wrongdoing. In view of this commitment, it is easy to understand why he can make sense of the idea of state legal wrongdoing only
as a fiction: it adds nothing to the fact that individuals are always the real
54. What is more, if the modus operandi of state legal responsibility is a legal fiction and, as
Lon Fuller writes, “[a] fiction becomes understandable only when we know why it exists,” then
reasons like those listed may well bolster its understandability. See L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS
(1967), at 49–50.
55. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1996), at 150 (ch. 22, para. 9–10). Perplexingly, Hobbes also
sometimes claims that the sovereign of a commonwealth, individual or body politic, is not
subject to the civil laws (id., ch. 26, para. 6). However, this claim is best understood as a
claim about Hobbes’s preferred constitutional arrangement for the commonwealth—i.e., a
monarch or assembly against whom citizens have no effective rights—which could intelligibly
be different.
56. H. KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (1997), at 49.
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subjects of legal duty-imposing norms and that it is always their individual
violations that are the true matters of concern.
Yet, if Pettit is right that at least some group actions are irreducible to the
actions of the group’s individual members and that states and state corporate bodies can act in such irreducible ways, then it is at least conceivable
that duty-imposing norms may be directed at the state’s irreducible actions
themselves. State legal wrongdoing may then not be or not always be purely
fictional. Notice also that even if one concedes, arguendo and pace Pettit, that
states and state corporate bodies are ultimately unfit to be held responsible
per se for their irreducible wrongdoing, and that resort to fictions of responsibility remains unavoidable for such holdings to be intelligible, Kelsen’s
model may still be inadequate to the extent that genuinely irreducible state
(qua group) actions and norm violations are conceivable. An explanatory
tertium quid between Kelsen’s individualistic fictionalism and Pettit’s robust
model of group responsibility may then be required to account for the possibility of irreducible collective action (including irreducible state action)
and group-directed (including state-directed) duty-imposing norms.

C. States as Unconstitutional Actors?
So far, I have been focusing mostly on state breaches of legal duties, contending that given an appropriate understanding of the state, they are conceivable even if perpetrated ultra vires. Now, even on the assumption that
this stance is accurate, one might here interject that insofar as it is at least
partly constituted by law, the state cannot intelligibly violate its constitutional
law. The state, it may be thought, cannot intelligibly violate the very law
that constitutes it without denaturing itself in the process. It is easy to see
why such a line of reasoning would be appealing to those who, like Kelsen,
believe that law is the state’s quintessential unifying feature, all the way
down. Yet, as I began to argue in the previous section, I think this approach
is unduly dogmatic and, as a result, misleading. I now want to bolster my
case by showing briefly, in a way that challenges Kelsen’s legalistic approach
more fundamentally, that there is some key sense of an abiding sociolegal
state of which we can speak intelligibly of as acting in a constitutionally
unauthorized fashion.
Consider first the following scenario. A state’s parliament or congress
enacts an unconstitutional law that is subsequently recognized by the executive, enforced by all the courts, and accepted by the population. If the law
has little constitutional importance (e.g., if it regulates the manufacture of
staplers), I see no reason to think that it is not the very state that adopted
it that is contravening its constitution. A defender of Kelsen may retort that
this insight can be explained by the fact that the law in question is not really
unconstitutional since it has not been annulled by any legally competent
organ—that is to say, it is not really invalid but merely voidable. Yet this
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cannot be the end of the story. There is an important sense in which if
the constitutionally defective law continues to be interpreted and applied
in the “incorrect” manner by all relevant parties and this new understanding becomes entrenched, the constitution will have been departed from
or modified in the process. In such cases, it may be more accurate to say
that the constitution has changed or been departed from, even if only minimally, while the identity of the state and, for that matter, the legal system
as a whole has not been altered. My claim that there is more to the state
than its constitutional law helps makes sense of this intuitively appealing
position.
To clarify the matter, it is useful to push the inquiry further: What if
the unconstitutional law adopted above were constitutionally significant? In
such cases, it is certainly more plausible to think that the continuity of the
state’s identity is disrupted. If a fundamental marker of the state’s identity
is significantly flouted, it seems reasonable to ask whether what remains
thereafter is the same state or sometimes even any state at all. The question,
then, could be reframed as follows: At what point on a spectrum of unconstitutionality does it become more accurate to speak of acts attributable to
a new state (or, alternatively, of nonstate actions)?
To some extent, legal theorists began to address the issue decades ago
when discussing revolutions and coups d’état. John Finnis and Joseph Raz,
whose work is perhaps most relevant here, both agree that the answer cannot be a mere matter of law. Their main reason for making this claim seems
unassailable. In Finnis’s words, social rules, be they legal, prelegal, conventional, or otherwise, “have no common identity or basis for existence in time
save that of the group of human beings which accepts them.”57 The reasoning underlying this conclusion is that any set of social rules, such as the rules
making up “a constitution,” is subject to change over time. Therefore, when
considered diachronically, a constitution must inevitably be understood as
a sequence of sets of rules. We think of this sequence of sets as a unified
constitution only because the ongoing group of human beings to which it
belongs accepts it as an efficacious and continuous unit.
Of course, if a state’s constitution—holistically understood as the set of
norms, both legal and conventional, that organize it—is widely disregarded,
then the continuity of this state is a nonissue. There is no state in the first
place. However, an implication of Finnis’s point seems to be that so long as
a sufficient constitutional framework subsists and is recognized, accepted,
and followed to a reasonable extent as if the same by the relevant human
grouping, which we may call the political community, then the identity
of the state constituted by it remains continuous (perhaps subject to some
limited exceptions). Given what I say above about the inevitable significance
57. J. Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND
SERIES (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973), at 70. See also J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (2nd
ed., 1980), at 188–189, 210–211.
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of sociopolitical considerations to the existence and organization of states,
this conclusion should come as no surprise.
One important consequence of this line of reasoning is that the continuity
of a state will sometimes be interwoven with considerations of realpolitik,
as demonstrated by countless cases of secession and decolonization in the
last century. Of course, there may be allegedly “legal” avenues to make
the cutoff point between the same and new states sharper. For example,
courts sometimes seek to bring the conduct of a usurper regime in line
with a preexisting constitution by drawing on all sorts of purportedly legal
techniques.
One case in point is the 1999 decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan
affirming the existence of a doctrine of state necessity in Pakistani constitutional law and applying it to deny the claim that the army had created a new
legal order by overthrowing democratically elected officials and proclaiming a state of emergency.58 In another recent case, Republic of Fiji v. Prasad,
the Court of Appeal of Fiji invoked an unprecedented principle of efficacy,
this time finding against the de facto rulers of the country and insisting on a
restoration of the previous constitutional order.59 Yet the crucial point here
is that the impact of these decisions on the states’ identities was necessarily
related to the political strength of the courts making them, as reflected
in the acceptance or rejection of the decisions by the rest of the political
community.
This point could probably be extended to most scenarios of significant
constitutional turmoil. Even if, as a result, it will often be difficult to predict the precise point on a spectrum of unconstitutionality at which a given
state will cease to exist, such uncertainty does not entail that states cannot
act unconstitutionally. On the contrary, significant unconstitutional actions
often fail to undermine the identity of states, which can even sometimes be
praised or criticized for them when there is a moral issue at stake. There is
no conceptual impediment to states being thought of in this way. To be sure,
it is true that in the context of a coup, acts contrary to prevailing constitutional norms will often become constitutionally authorized in some sense.
For example, an allegedly legal yet also clearly political pronouncement
may hold sway, as in the Pakistani predicament discussed above, or the constitution may be modified ex post facto to legalize illegality. However, the
ultimate test for determining the identity of a state is not legal recognition
in this secondary sense. It is, first and foremost, persistent recognition by
the relevant political community.
One appealing corollary of this understanding is that it makes intelligible
the widely held assumption that constitutions are not “suicide pacts” that
states must necessarily uphold in all their facets if they are to subsist. This
58. Zafar Ali Shah v Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869
(Pak.).
59. Republic of Fiji v Prasad, [2001] NZAR 385 (CA) (Fiji).
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outcome is salutary, given the long judicial and theoretical lineage of the
assumption.60 Even a thinker such as Immanuel Kant, who deduces from
a priori principles the intrinsic necessity of a staunchly inflexible constitutional separation between the legislative (sovereign), executive, and judicial
powers (Gewalten) of the state, recognizes the conceptual possibility of unconstitutional derogations by states. For example, he argues that whereas in
an ideal world no one would ever usurp the function of the judicial power,
the sovereign may do so in a “case of necessity,” when rigorous compliance
with the legal framework would cause the state to dissolve into a “state of
nature, which is far worse because there is no external justice at all in it.”61
To be even more specific, he claims that if the judicial power were ever
required by a priori principles to sentence so many people to death as to
endanger the stability of the state, the sovereign should be able to “pronounce a judgment that decrees for the criminals a sentence . . . which still
preserves the population.” He insists that such a pronouncement “cannot
be done in accordance with public law but [that] it can be done by executive
decree that is, by an act of the right of majesty.”62
The line of criticism briefly elaborated in this section is no doubt more
damaging to Kelsen’s overall project than the one developed in the previous
section. It purports to show that a purely legalistic understanding of the state
is unable to account for the state’s existence through time, whether it is understood as the legal order itself or, more materially, as state-government.
Something else is needed to provide diachronic unity to the state. That
something else, I suggest above, is the ongoing common identity of the political community, whose persistent recognition of the state’s constitutional
framework, acceptance of it, and abidance by it provides the state with its life
and blood. It is because Kelsen lacks the concept of a political community—
or what John Austin gestures towards when referring to “an independent
political society”63 —in which states find their very real and tangible roots
that he is unable to account satisfactorily for their continuity. Only after this
concept has been at least partly explained in nonlegal, sociological terms
does it become possible to explain the persistence of states (and, one might
add, legal systems) through time.
Of course, “political community” is itself a hazy concept—perhaps just as
much as the notion of “nation,” often invoked to single out a community
of people bound by common ancestry, history, or tradition who seek to
60. For judicial pronouncements, see Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re),
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 ¶6 (Can. Sup. Ct.); Attorney Gen. of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim,
[1964] Cyprus L. Rep. 195 at 237 (Triantafyllides, J.) (C.A.) (Cyprus); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), 37
(Jackson, J., dissenting). For an interesting theoretical discussion, see J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980), at 275.
61. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (M. Gregor ed., 1991), at 107. Compare with Kant’s
exposé on the three powers (also translated as “authorities”) of an ideal state; id. at 90–95.
62. Id. at 107–108.
63. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954), at 192–193.
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govern themselves with a set of political institutions.64 But the haziness
is deliberate: I am using the concept merely as a way of conveying the
possibility of a sufficient degree of diachronic group identification, as well
as ongoing recognition and support for a constitutional framework, by a
given population, its officials, and relevant international actors.
As a more detailed account, replete with its unavoidable complexities,
would needlessly detract from my argument, I shall refrain from saying any
more here and await another more appropriate occasion. I shall only add in
passing that some theorists think that moral constraints must supplement
the ongoing social existence and attitudes of the political community in any
complete explanation of the continuity of states. They speak, for example, of
the need for an “ethically reasonable” allegiance to the state’s constitutional
order.65 I very much doubt the helpfulness of this extra move. It seems rather
gratuitously restrictive from an explanatory standpoint and moreover risks
dragging us back into the type of conflation of the conceptual with the moral
from which I sought to steer clear in Section I.A. Besides, this extra move is
unnecessary to convey the force of the more limited point I seek to make,
which is that, pace Kelsen, exercises of powers conferred by constitutional
norms, as well as by legal norms more generally, are not—and cannot be—
the be-all and end-all of the life of the state.
III. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE MEANS
AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE
Could it be that when he writes that actions taken “outside the law” cannot
be those of a state, Dyzenhaus, who departs from Kelsen’s work in other
respects, is making a different or further claim from the one I have been
discussing so far? Perhaps he means that states and their agents cannot
conceivably act by nonlegal means. Indeed, he sometimes ambiguously remarks that “the state’s authority has to be exercised through law.”66 This
interpretation of his position is odd, since as citizens we regularly witness
our officials’ attempts to guide us in the name of the state through nonlegal
means. They often advise us, entice us, or exhort us to act in certain ways. In
fact, as Leslie Green remarks, “probably no state could function if law were
its only resource in guiding action. . . . In some circumstances, nonlegal
64. For similar formulations, see Y. TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1995), at 63–69; K.A. APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005), at 244. For further definitional complications, see M.C.
NUSSBAUM, THE CLASH WITHIN: DEMOCRACY, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, AND INDIA’S FUTURE (2007), at
10–16.
65. See especially Finnis, Revolutions, supra note 57, at 76. Since I discuss an aspect of Immanuel Kant’s conception of the state above, it is perhaps also worth noting that Kant, also,
understands the diachronic unity of the state in a deeply moralized, though differently conceived, way. Relevant insights can be found in A. RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ch. 11 (2009).
66. Dyzenhaus, Compulsion of Legality, supra note 2, at 37 (emphasis added).
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requirements may even be preferred where legal regulation would be inefficient, self-defeating, or symbolically inappropriate.”67 So nonlegal state
action is commonplace, and it is doubtful that Dyzenhaus means to deny
this.
Perhaps, then, what Dyzenhaus really wants to emphasize is that when a
state does not act “through law,” its acts have no authority. However, even this
additional thought seems misguided. It is true that state agents commonly
resort to law as a means of guiding the behavior of the governed. In fact, it
is their primary means of doing so. It is also true that rules of law are, or are
claimed to be, authoritative rules that guide the behavior of their subjects
by providing them with content-independent, binding reasons to act. Yet
states sometimes provide reasons that do not derive their authority from
a legal system. For example, they may indicate or invoke the existence
of independently authoritative reasons emanating from individuals and
organizations that are held to have deeper moral insight, special expertise,
or unique coordination ability and are generally treated (and sometimes
legitimately so) as practical authorities.
Consider, along this line, the South African government’s frequent invocations of Nelson Mandela’s pronouncements or references by U.S. state
officials to the words of the Founding Fathers as authoritative reasons for
action. Think also of state appeals to directives from the World Health Organization as authoritative guides in times of pandemic. Moreover, states
may, through their agents, claim to provide practical guidance that is more
robustly authoritative in virtue of the fact that they are the ones providing
it. Even when this guidance is legally invalid—because it stems from some
ultra vires act—it may still be treated as authoritative by its addressees (i.e.,
as guidance that is binding for the reason that it emanates from the state).
So guidance that is not strictly speaking guidance “through law” because it is
legally invalid, yet is attributable to a state (understood in sociolegal terms),
may still have de facto authority over its addressees. To the extent that such
de facto authoritative guidance makes it more likely that its addressees will
comply better with reason by conforming to it than by following their own
lights—say, because of the state’s better coordination position—it may even
be legitimately authoritative.68
Finally, building on the argument of the last section, if the diachronic
identity (and thus existence) of state and law is indeed contingent on the
common identity of and recognition by the relevant political community,
then there is only a small step to the contention that the authority of state
and law through time cannot be traced back to the law itself, or at least
67. L. GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1990), at 77. Green gives the example of a system
of prices and incomes restraints that may be justifiable only in the absence of administrative
costs associated with its legal imposition. He also points to systems of voluntary restraints that
by definition cannot be legally imposed.
68. See generally J. Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1003 (2006), on the normal justification of authority.
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not entirely so. If this inference is correct—and I cannot defend it further
here—Kelsen’s purely normative approach to theorizing law and whatever
Dyzenhaus makes of it may need to be rethought, or at least significantly
supplemented.
If we are to make any sense of a position such as Dyzenhaus’s, I think
we must understand it as something more than a mere set of descriptive
and conceptual claims about states and their authority. We must approach
it for what it really is: a morally laden normative thesis. At that level, many
important questions subsist. For example, when are states really bound by
law? Should or may they ever legitimately depart from it? Insofar as they
do contravene domestic law, how should they be held accountable? Should
the law itself seek to play that role, and if so, under what guise—public,
civil, criminal, public international, or international criminal law? Should
we bank instead on nonlegal restraints such as social and political mores
or direct action by “the people” (or the political community more broadly
understood)? These are all important and complex questions that are receiving an increasing amount of attention nowadays from theorists studying the implications of public emergencies for state and law. This interest
should come as no surprise, since public emergencies are fertile grounds
for state illegality. Kelsenian conceptual dogmatism and Dyzenhaus’s puzzling extrapolations on the same theme should not be allowed to preempt
or otherwise distort their important efforts.
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